The following chapter was printed inContempory International Issues, edited by Steven L. Lamy and published by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO., 1988.

U.S. Perspectives on the Soviet Union

In the United States, references to the Soviet Union evoke strong feelings. Reactions may range from total condemnation to high praise for the accomplishments of the world's first socialist country and worker's state. For many people, a mention of the U.S.S.R. conjures up images of an "evil empire" driving for world domination and posing an imminent threat to the values of the Western world. There are those who are sympathetic to the accomplishments of socialism in raising the Soviet standard of living despite the effect of two devastating world wars and other formidable obstacles, including Western blockades. Still, a good number of individuals have mixed feelings about the Soviet government and its people. The different images held by leaders and citizens must be carefully considered as one attempts to understand the very complex and critical relationship between the United States and the U.S.S.R.. The worldviews analytical approach presented in this book encourages the student of international affairs to consider carefully all relevant images of significantly controversial issues. This chapter identifies three differing interpretations of issues defining relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Contending images of the superpowers are built upon the scholarly contributions of historians and political scientists. and the evaluations of experienced policymakers. Each perspective or worldview discussed in this chapter is based on a set of assumptions that serves to define an analytical orientation. Scholars and policymakers continue to use such analyses to describe and evaluate the interactions between these two competing powers.

The U.S.-Soviet relationship is particularly important as an area of study because this relationship and the worldviews associated with it tend to structure other international relationships and worldviews. For example, in a tense bipolar Cold War environment, the relations between the United States and its allies are significantly different than during an era characterized by detente or cordial relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R.. In times of tension and uncertainty in U.S.-Soviet relations, other states must respond to this tension, often with little hope or means of influencing the actions of either state. The superpower relationship and the perception of the relationship by leaders in the United States and the Soviet Union become part of the environment of international politics for other states and bring about certain policies and policy responses. Ultimately, it is the U.S.-Soviet relationship that determines whether the global community as we know it continues to exist. This fact underlies the importance of the U.S. views of the Soviet Union and the Soviet perspectives of the United States.

The analysis of Soviet foreign policy is a complex undertaking which involves, as do all political questions, opposing points of view. (Horelick, et al., 1975) The controversial nature of U.S.-Soviet relations necessitates a careful assessment of different interpretations of U.S. views of Soviet foreign policy. In its portrayal of the Soviet Union, it has not been uncommon for the U.S. media to draw a Cold War or confrontational image of the Soviets. The Cold War image is reinforced by those policymakers who consider the Soviets as the major competitor of the United States. But this is only one of several ways to see the Soviets. It would be safe to say that this "us-them" or "evil empire" view of the Soviet Union is held by many citizens in the United States. (Welch, 1970) And conversely, the dominant Soviet perspective is best described as a mirror image of the U.S. view of the Soviet Union. (Lenczowski, 1982) (Schwartz, 1978) (Gilbert, 1977)

Three main worldviews affecting the U.S. study of Soviet foreign policy and U.S.-Soviet relations have been identified. These views reflect a range of perceptions about the nature of the superpower relationship and the international role of the Soviets. They also reflect a U.S. view of the international system: Hence the system maintainer regards the Soviet Union as an enemy, an irreconcilable antagonist that should be dominated or controlled by the United States. The system reformer sees the Soviet Union more as an equal and legitimate competitor. In this worldview, the United States must cooperate closely with the Soviet Union to avoid systemic war. The United States and the Soviet Union, as rule makers, continue to control a significant proportion of the spoils in the international system. The third perspective, that of the global cooperationist, is akin to that of the system transformer. In general, it is critical of U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. U.S. foreign policy, according to this perspective, engenders conflict and confrontation rather than encouraging peace. While these worldview categories are broad and subject to exceptions and caveats, they provide a useful analytical framework to better organize and understand the official and unofficial U.S. perceptions about Soviet foreign policy behavior.

The System-Maintainer Worldview: "The Enemy"

The system-maintainer perspective is often associated with a conservative political orientation in the United States. The Soviet Union is regarded as an implacable enemy. The intellectual origins of this perspective date back to the post 1945 Cold War era. The underlying key assumption in this stridently anti-Communist mode of thinking is that the Soviet Union is an aggressive, hostile, and inflexible totalitarian dictatorship incapable of change. Those who hold this worldview suggest that the motive behind Soviet policy is one of unbridled expansionism, driven by Moscow's desire to spread revolution and communism worldwide at the expense of the capitalist democratic states of the Western world and their spheres of influence. (Pipes, 1981) (Conquest, 1979) (Tucker, 1981) (Brezezinski, 1977)

From the system-maintainer point of view, the Soviet Union's foreign policy goals are hostile to U.S. interests. The goal of Soviet actions in the international system is to gain advantages over the United States and the West. Thus, any possibility of long-term peaceful coexistence between the East and West is considered unlikely. The United States is seen as a representative of all that is good and virtuous in the world. System maintainers recognize the responsibility of the United States to uphold the interests of the free world, contain, and even attempt to bring the Soviet system to an end. The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is seen as a total war. It involves competition in all regions of the world in economic, political-diplomatic, and socio-cultural policy areas.

The Role of the Military and Diplomacy

One of the basic assumptions of the system maintainer worldview is that military strength is the key to success in the international system. The anarchy of the international system requires that states maintain enough power to guarantee that other states do not challenge their national interests. The distribution of power in the international system since 1945 has resulted in a bipolar East-West world, which system maintainers see as the major division in international politics. This East-West analysis of world affairs influences all policy actions. At the heart of competition for control of the international system is an expensive and potentially dangerous arms race. Military competition drives and defines the relationship between the world's two superpowers.

The "enemy" motif is central to the system-maintainer perspective. (Finlay, Hoisti, Fagen, 1967) It sees the U.S.S.R. as an inherent adversary of the United States. The enemy is evil, ominous - a force that should be eliminated. President Reagan, for example, earlier in his presidency, denounced the Soviet Union as the "focus of evil" in modern civilization. It follows that if a country is perceived as an enemy, there is little chance to live side-by-side with it peacefully. Enemies are to be defeated, tormented and humiliated. Everything, the enemy does is suspect, motivated by self-serving or deceitful causes. This is the nature of the logic characteristic of a system-maintainer view, which champions the cause of a virtuous U.S. society against an evil Soviet totalitarian dictatorship. (Berman, 1958) It is noteworthy that Mr. Reagan repudiated the "evil empire" characterization of the Soviet Union following the May 1988 summit with Mr. Gorbachev.

When translated into foreign policy, the system-maintainer worldview emphasizes cautious and incremental bargaining with the enemy, supported by a strong military position aimed at containing any expansionary moves by the other side. The containment policy stresses a posture of aggressive and hostile confrontation of the Soviet Union. Since Moscow is regarded as a political adversary, this view stresses the need for a strong military buildup, limited economic or diplomatic interaction, and a tough, untrusting, and cynical style of diplomacy. Historically, this policy orientation has resulted in an atmosphere of Cold War tensions, confrontational politics, East-West competition in the Third World, minimal economic relations, and unregulated military competition. The danger of the Soviet threat is stressed, and U.S. policymakers are generally pessimistic about the future viability of the relationship.

Deterioration of U.S.-Soviet Relations in the 1980s

The Reagan administration through late 1987, despite showing some willingness to talk with the Soviets about controlling the continuing arms race, best typifies this perspective in recent history. (Nye, 1982) In national-security policy areas, President Reagan has promoted unregulated military competition as exemplified by Star Wars or the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This has resulted in a sharp escalation of the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union and has encouraged the deployment of new weapons systems. On the economic side, the Reagan administration in the early 1980s was responsible for initiating a wave of sanctions, restrictions, and barriers designed to minimize or severely limit trading relations with the East. Economic sanctions against Moscow in the early 1980s included a grain embargo to halt the shipment of 17 million tons of U.S. grain to the U.S.S.R.; trade sanctions to block the sale of equipment to build the Yamal Pipeline Project, which would transport gas from Western Siberia to Western Europe; and expanded restrictions on exchange and cooperation agreements on energy, technology, and joint research. Social and cultural links were curtailed, despite a few efforts to revive them. By the mid-1980s there began some movement toward warming relations between the superpowers; however, these efforts are still subject to the barriers accompanying the traditional perception of the U.S.S.R. as the enemy of the United States.

Nonetheless, the success of Soviet and American summitry in 1987 and 1988 has been a major factor in breaking the stalemate between both countries. As a result of the good will generated at these summits. political, economic, and cultural relations markedly improved by the late 1980s, engendering a new wave of business activities, and cultural, artistic, and student exchanges. It remains to be seen whether this budding detente is cosmetic and short-term or will result in a longer-term stability.

U.S.-Soviet relations until recently, experienced, under the Reagan administration, the greatest deterioration since the postwar tensions of the late 1940s and the early 1950s or the Cuban missile crisis of 1961. Many factors have contributed to U.S.-Soviet distrust and competition:

  1. Escalation of the arms race by both superpowers

  2. Growth of a conservative domestic political trend in the United States

  3. Ongoing conflict in the Middle East

  4. Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan

  5. Soviet military activity in the Pacific

  6. Continued differences over U.S. and Soviet activities in Third World regions such as southern Africa and Central America

    The Effects of U.S.-Soviet Competition on the World

    During most of the Reagan years, a persistent political and diplomatic stalemate punctuated by ups and downs left the United States and the U.S.S.R. deeply suspicious of and hostile to each other. Each blames the other side for causing the deterioration of the relationship. In public discussions, both sides claim to have made sincere peace proposals and attempts to reach an accommodation at the negotiating table. Some U.S. and Soviet specialists suggest that military interests and political leaders need the other side to enhance their power and influence. Leaders in both countries are continually reacting to the actions of their enemies and blaming the other side for most of the world's problems. The implications of this image of the world for the superpowers and other states are serious and far-reaching. When the superpowers are experiencing tense relations the rest of the world cringes. An increase in arms productions in the Soviet Union or the United States usually means more arms transfers to client states and an increase in uncertainty and tensions in unstable regions of the world.

    What has resulted is increased military competition with new and less stable, less verifiable conventional and nuclear-weapons systems. The nuclear-arms race between the two superpowers threatens the continuation of civilization. Citizens throughout the world are fearful of an escalating level of tension between the superpowers. This tension is played out in Third World areas where the Soviet Union and the United States (or their surrogates ) are involved in armed conflict (e.g., Nicaragua and Afghanistan). An increasing number of people believe that these conflicts could escalate beyond a regional and conventional exchange with superpower involvement. U.S. citizens are frequently warned by their government that the Soviet Union is an expansionary power out to take over the world. Such an assessment creates not only fear and distrust, but,an often irrational evaluation of Soviet motives and intentions. In a similar style, Soviet citizens are told by their government that aggressive and militaristic U.S. foreign policy has imperialistic goals. Furthermore, official Soviet foreign policy suggests that U.S. military strategy is to seek global domination and that, unless the United States is checked, the result will be war against the Soviet homeland. This has contributed to a periodic siege mentality among Soviet citizens and, likewise, fear in the United States that Soviets will do anything to prevent this. Many people in both societies strongly believe that hostilities between the superpowers are inevitable. Thus, for system maintainers in the United States, the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship is best described as a confrontational one in which the security of each state is based on having military strength enough to deter the other side from hostile attack.

    Reagan's maintainer position, however, was softened by the rise to power of Mikhail S. Gorbachev, and his attempts to democratize the Soviet Union through policies of glasnost and perestroika. Gorbachev's personal charm, combined with his extraordinary diplomatic skills and flair for promoting friendly relations with Western nations has managed to neutralize even the harshest U.S. critics of the Soviet Union, and the bitter acrimony characterizing U.S.-Soviet relations for most of the decade of the 1980s is subsiding.

    The U.S. System-Reformer Perspective: "Manage the Competition"

    The working assumptions underlying a reformer position are perhaps more utopian than those of the traditional realist or system-maintainer position. Core assumptions are the belief in the viability of U.S.-Soviet cooperation and the recognition that both superpowers have shared interests. Policymakers tend to be more optimistic about the use of conferences, treaty sessions, and summit meetings as forums for resolving conflicts and thereby easing tensions. The Soviet Union is recognized as a responsive and flexible partner, open to U.S. overtures and willing to discuss points of contention. Reformers see the Soviet Union as sincere about becoming a more reliable custodian in the international system. It is thought that the strident and militant Marxist-Leninist ideological orientation has been modified in favor of a more pragmatic position that in many policy areas upholds the status quo.

    In the system-reformer worldview, the Soviet Union is identified as a great-power competitor of the United States. In contrast to the system-maintainer view, reformers emphasize the necessity to manage carefully the dynamics of superpower competition through open diplomacy. This worldview is often associated with a more moderate foreign-policy position in the United States.

    The Uses of Diplomacy

    Foreign-policy decisionmakers who hold a system-reformer view have often focused their efforts on the use of diplomacy as an instrument of projecting U.S. power and prestige in the international political system. These same leaders tend to emphasize "carrots" rather than "sticks" in their attempts to move the Soviet leaders in a desired political direction. From this perspective, both the United States and the Soviet Union are seen to be competing in a global chess game with each trying to outmaneuver the other. The stakes are high - the hearts and minds of the citizens of the world. U.S. policymakers have acknowledged that Soviet expansionism poses a tough challenge; nonetheless, they have expressed confidence and optimism that the challenge can be controlled through managed competition, negotiation, and tough bargaining within the context of a responsible and regulated bilateral relationship.

    Thus, system reformers see the Kremlin leaders as pragmatic actors who have abandoned the former zeal for constant disruption and upheaval of the international political system. U.S. reformers emphasize that the Soviet Union and the West have many common interests, such as the prevention of systemic war, the regulation of Third World conflicts, and the promotion of trade and economic development. The reformers are not so naive as to assume that cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union will eventually result in a world free of conflict and war. Instead, they support the maintenance of a cautious and incremental bargaining posture vis -a-vis the Soviets. The key is to move away from the inordinate fear of the Soviet system that has driven U.S. foreign policy in the past. The reformers among U.S. policymakers and interest groups believe that a mixture of cooperation and competition, with a heavier emphasis on cooperation, will lead to a more successful and stable U.S.-Soviet relationship. (Kennan, 1982), (Legvold, 1980), (Shulman, 1984) Furthermore, their image of the Soviet Union is that of a society that can be won over to a way of doing things more consistent with U.S. values. 'The liberalization policies currently being suggested by Soviet leaders represent affirmations of this position.

    From this viewpoint, the Soviet Union is regarded as a limited adversary. A natural outcome of this is policy-making that advocates a two-track approach featuring more "carrots" but some "sticks." This means that the United States will assume a firm and strong posture (sticks) on some issues, and encourage cooperation (carrots) in other policy areas. Through an adroit combination of constraints and incentives in dealing with Moscow, reformers believe that it is possible to improve U.S.-Soviet relations without sacrificing U.S. security. A calculated use of concessions and other confidence-building measures (such as recognizing Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe and East Asia) and positive inducements (such as trade) are used to influence Soviet behavior. These concessions and inducements can be used to shape Soviet foreign policy or to deter some Soviet activities. The continuation of this policy position is linked to Soviet behavior. As long as the Soviets act in a pragmatic fashion and do not attempt to challenge U.S. interests, cooperation will continue. Not unlike the earlier efforts at community-building in Europe, the U.S. and Soviet cooperation will spill over into other policy areas. Cooperation will eventually create a political environment based on managed and regulated connections or linkages between the superpowers and their allies. Thus, as long as the rules of the game are followed and no encroachments are made by either side, both states can and will coexist. Incentives to bargain must be kept high and disincentives for any attempt to change the system must also be high. However, the relationship is carefully managed and cultivated, detente can be achieved and tensions minimized. This will obviously depend upon a willingness by both parties to share power and collaborate for mutual gain. (George, 1983) This represents a move away from the zero-sum attitude of the maintainers (i.e., Soviet gains mean U.S. losses) to a positive-sum attitude (i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union can both win).

    The Breakdown of Detente

    In the defense-policy area, the system reformer is likely to want to maintain limits on offensive weapons set in the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I and SALT 11 negotiations, and strengthen treaties such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Reformers stress the need for arms-control negotiations in an effort to manage the arms race. On economic issues, the system reformer hopes to increase trade between the East and West by eliminating the most restrictive of the tariff and non-tariff barriers. Trade and economic development policies are seen as primary tools that the United States and the West can use to effect change in Soviet behavior. With the goal of increasing understanding of each system by the other, social and cultural contacts are encouraged by reformers. This might include an increased number of high-level diplomatic consultations, along with more citizen, sports, cultural, entertainment, and student exchanges.

    The Carter administration policies toward the Soviets through late 1978 comes the closest to this worldview. However, it should be pointed out that the Nixon-Kissinger era of detente (early 1970s) did represent a break in the hard-core maintainer position and a move toward a system-reformer position. The Nixon-Brezhnev Summit in 1972, opened the gates for the expansion of trading, economic, and more meaningful diplomatic activity. Both Nixon and Kissinger promoted a foreign policy that represented the ideals of the system maintainer; however, they recognized that the transformations defining the contemporary system required a more nontraditional strategy, one which utilized trade, alliances, personal diplomacy, and other nonmilitary tools of statecraft. Similarly, in the late years of his administration, Reagan gravitated towards a similar position.

    The Carter administration hoped to moderate the U.S.-Soviet relationship further by moving U.S. foreign policy away from its emphasis on containment and its almost exclusive concentration on the Soviet Union as the source of all of the world's problems. Carter encouraged a shift away from a peace-through-strength view to one of arms control. He also urged the U.S. citizenry to consider North-South as well as East-West issues. Carter's emphasis on human rights and his concern about the indigenous causes of conflict in the Third World were indicative of his efforts. Carter was considered by many to be too soft on the Soviets, allowing them to build more weapons, move ahead of the United States, and increase their power base. However, supporters claim the foreign policy of the early Carter administration represented an attempt to replace a balance of terror with a more pluralistic vision of world order.

    While the first half of the Carter administration reflected the system-reformer point of view, in the later years a shift occurred that essentially redefined foreign-policy goals in terms of a maintainer worldview. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan seemed to destroy the arguments put forth by those who disputed the old warning that the Soviets only reacted to a show of force. This invasion sparked a new wave of embargoes on grain and technology, restrictions on Soviet fishing off U.S. shores, the Olympic boycott, and the renewal of draft registration. It also inspired the Carter Doctrine, which pledged to respond to Soviet incursions in the Persian Gulf region with military force, if necessary. The goals of this doctrine were twofold: first, it acted as a symbolic expression of U.S. outrage and disapproval at the Soviet intervention, and second, it hoped to discourage future aggressive Soviet activities in the Third World. (Garthoff, 1985) In other words, a changing set of conditions had brought about a deterioration of detente and the relatively stable U.S.-Soviet relationship that had accompanied it.

    Soviet aggression and the perception that U.S. power had declined contributed to a shift in public attitudes. The people's wish for a strong United States removed most of the incentives for U.S. leaders to embrace the reformer position. Many believe that Carter's attempts to shift U.S. foreign policy priorities to the reformist position contributed to his electoral defeat. The Reagan administration for the most part has taken a system-maintainer position and only recently has shown signs of increasing U.S.-Soviet cooperation.

    A U.S. System-Transformer View of U.S.-Soviet Relations

    As the introduction of this book suggests, there are several different perspectives within the system-transformer category. The most appropriate characterization of the transformer position within the context of U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union is best described as an "idealist" or "alternative" perspective. Proponents of this position tend to blame unilateralism and the emphasis on power politics for tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although seeing both sides as contributing to this climate of fear and tension, transformers in the United States tend to focus their criticisms on their own society because this is where they have the potential to change policy. Generally, those who hold this position feel that the traditional views of state-centrism, anarchy, and self-help must be replaced my multilateralism, the recognition that common rules of behavior must exist, and that non-force policy options must be used to resolve conflicts.

    The Rise of a New Perspective

    Alternative perspectives on U.S.-Soviet relations gained attention in the early 1960s when many scholars realized the need to reevaluate the Cold War literature on Soviet foreign policy written by more traditional scholars. (Williams, 1962, Alperovitz, 1965, Kolko, 1968) Since then, various alternative positions have challenged the conservatism and realist orientation of mainstream U.S. academic writings on the Soviet Union and international politics in general. These alternative perspectives include writings from the disarmament and antinuclear movement, the peace movement, and literature on anti-imperialism and dependency. In general, writers within these schools of thought trace belligerent Soviet foreign policy behavior to what they see as militant and imperialistic U.S. policies. These policies are seen as attempts to expand the power and influence of the United States far beyond its own borders. While system maintainers emphasize Soviet rigidity and totalitarianism, proponents of these alternative views stress the reactive and adaptive nature of Soviet policy. Western diplomatic practice, accordingly, is held responsible for exacerbating tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. These transformers often oppose mainstream U.S. government policies and blame the unbridled pursuit of U.S. political and economic interests as the major cause of international tension.

    This system-transformer perspective gained a significant number of adherents during the 1960s. This was in part the result of the reflection on and evaluation of U.S. foreign policy caused by the Vietnam War and a climate of turmoil and unrest in U.S. society. During that period, the intellectual foundations of this view of U.S.-Soviet relations were further developed and became a major part of the policy debates in Washington, and caused many U.S. citizens to reassess the direction of U.S. foreign policy since 1945. Events in the 1970s (e.g., the "eagle-defiant" attitude of the Reagan administration) moved the alternative view to the periphery of intellectual and policy debates. However, in recent years many activist groups interested in peace, social justice, and ecological issues have brought this viewpoint back into discussions about the future path of U.S.-Soviet relations. These groups are generally supportive of policies that challenge status-quo or system-maintainer viewpoints.

    The policy positions that evolve from this worldview are very diverse. Nonetheless, a few consistent common beliefs are apparent, among them advocating a halt to an expansionary and aggressive U.S. foreign policy, cutting military spending, and fostering a cooperative rather than confrontational posture toward Moscow. The alternative view stresses in no uncertain terms the need for U.S. leadership in ending or minimizing East-West tensions. However, most who ascribe to the assumptions of this view are opposed to both U.S. and Soviet foreign-policy orientations, regarding both states as superpower aggressors engaged in the calculated pursuit of their respective national interests and the extension of their own spheres of influence, especially in the Third World often endangering world peace in the process. Proponents of this view stress policies designed to contain the incursions of both superpowers in Third World nations, and to protect the integrity of neutral or nonaligned nations that might otherwise become caught in the middle of superpower conflicts.

    Identifying System Transformers

    It is difficult to identify one type of organization or a country that has built a policy position around the goals of this worldview. System transformers in this policy area include some members of the Non-Aligned Movement in the Third World, political movements such as the Green Party in West Germany, and disarmament-advocacy groups in the United States. These transformers are not always condemnatory of U.S. policy nor can many of them be considered as political radicals attempting to impose an ideal system. In the United States, most of the members of the peace and social-justice community of advocacy organizations embrace the transformer's views. (Reardon, 1992, Caldicott, 1991, Griffiths and Polyani, 1978) Many of the organizations in this movement represent religious groups opposed to war and concerned about social justice, economic rights, and the militarism and violence that seem to rule U.S. society. These transformers believe one solution is to return power to the people, eliminate domestic power structures favoring the elite, and change an international structure dominated by the United States and the U.S.S.R.. "Equality for all nations" and a "world without war and injustice" are the opinions uniting advocates of this position. Many have a desire to transform the world's present "state of anarchy" into a system of "states in cooperation" mutually working together to solve common problems without resorting to force. Finally, the perspective of anti-imperialism, popular in the early 1970s, condemns the expansionist and aggressive policies of either one or both superpower nations. (Fann and Hodges, 1971) (Mack et al., 1979) (Greene, 1971) Dependencias, or those who adhere to a dependency perspective of international politics, focus mainly on the effects and causes of U.S. imperialism in the Third World. (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979) (Moran, 1974) (Evans, 1979)

    One significant outgrowth of dissatisfaction with traditional or "establishment" approaches to conflict, arms control, and peace has been the rise of a broad-based citizen's diplomacy movement in the United States. (Warner and Shuman, 1987) Numerous U.S. organizations, ranging from church to antinuclear activist groups, are initiating people-to-people-exchange delegations to hold political discussions, share ideas about important issues, and international good will. "Global town meetings" have linked Soviet with U.S. citizens through radio linkups, featuring well-known moderators such as Cable News Network-owner Ted Turner. The "Donahue" show has featured a television linkup allowing U.S. and Soviet people to communicate with each other via satellite. The discussion often became lively and heated as both audiences shared common social experiences and queried each other about foreign-policy issues. Other efforts, in addition to the traditional peace marches, have included a "Peace Cruise" down the Mississippi River. A group of U.S. and Soviet citizens from all walks of life held seminars on the arms race and spoke to people about peace as the ship stopped at several ports. Upon completion of the journey, they drafted "A People's Appeal for Peace," which was later presented to President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev.

    This transformer view is still a minority position in U.S. policy debates. However, the number of people urging cooperation and an end to the arms race is growing. The "peace and cooperation" alternative is gaining momentum as more and repeated attempts by the superpowers fail to sufficiently limit or halt the arms race. Advocates of this perspective have rejected several ideas common to today's international politics, including the basic assumption that one or two states should control the international system and that leaders of states should instinctively regard each other as enemies in pursuit of divergent goals. Instead, system transformers hope to alter fundamentally relationships of exploitation and domination in favor of working together for the common good. In other words, in this specific policy area the focus is on the need for the United States and the U.S.S.R. to work with other states through regional and international organizations to achieve peace. This multilateralism must replace unilateralism if peace is to be achieved.

    Concluding Remarks

    Each of the three worldviews discussed in this chapter is based on an image of the world built upon differing assumptions about the nature of Soviet foreign policy, the character of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and how each country should respond to the other. No one worldview has a monopoly on the truth. Each has its own biases in what it does and does not consider important and relevant data.

    First, it is most important to recognize that alternative interpretations of Soviet foreign policy do exist. It is up to students of international affairs thoroughly to critique and assess each one, before dismissing any view as illegitimate or accepting one as legitimate. Second, it is essential to realize that when applied to actual foreign-policy processes or when put into practice, the assumptions of each worldview may lead to vastly different conclusions, policy outcomes, or consequences. How U.S. leaders look at and evaluate the Soviet Union ultimately has important consequences for a variety of issues and actors in international politics-especially considering the different policy outcomes characteristic of each worldview. Political awareness is necessary to encourage thoughtful and informed decisionmaking, and to aid citizens in their efforts to develop their own views on the foreign-policy process. The application of an analytical framework that encourages a review of contending positions encourages critical and evaluative thinking, and a deeper appreciation of the complexities and choices involved in the policy process.

    There are three primary goals to keep in mind when learning about different U.S. perspectives of Soviet foreign-policy behavior. The first is to be a critical, comparative thinker when analyzing the issues defining this complex relationship. The second relates to the controversial nature of the issue. It is important that students develop a sophisticated research design which encourages an in-depth exploration of each perspective. The third is to recognize that there are available a variety of sources of information reflecting contending perspectives . These varied sources must be considered in order to reach a thorough understanding of the issues that define U.S.-Soviet affairs and to develop informed responses to these issues.

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    Deborah Anne Palmieri
    Contempory International Issues.
    Steven L. Lamy, Editor.
    Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1988

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